The integrated stress response (ISR) is a key determinant of tumorigenesis in response to oncogenic forms of stress like genotoxic, proteotoxic and metabolic stress. ISR relies on the phosphorylation of the translation initiation factor eIF2 to promote the translational and transcriptional reprogramming of gene expression in stressed cells. While ISR promotes tumor survival under stress, its hyperactivation above a level of tolerance can also cause tumor death. The tumorigenic function of ISR has been recently demonstrated for lung adenocarcinomas (LUAD) with (...) KRAS mutations. ISR mediates the translational repression of the dual‐specificity phosphatase DUSP6 to stimulate ERK activity and LUAD growth. The significance of this finding is highlighted by the strong anti‐tumor responses of ISR inhibitors in pre‐clinical LUAD models. Elucidation of the mechanisms of ISR action in LUAD progression via cell‐autonomous and immune regulatory mechanisms will provide a better understanding of its tumorigenic role to fully exploit its therapeutic potential in the treatment of a deadly form of cancer. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:176 HUME ON PROMISES AND THEIR OBLIGATION This discussion of Hume's account of promises pursues certain issues raised by William Vitek in his paper "The Humean Promise: Whence Comes Its Obligation?" The question I consider first is what, for Hume, it is for someone to make a promise. I then go on to consider Hume's view of promisekeeping as an artificial virtue and the distinction which Hume makes between (...) two kinds of obligation in relation to promises: a natural and an artificial obligation. The issue with which I am principally concerned is how far Hume succeeds in explaining our recognition of the obligation to keep promises. The Humean Promise There is implicit in Hume's "Of the Obligation of Promises" an account of what it is for someone to make a promise, i.e., of the conditions which are at least necessary for this to occur. It is worthwhile making these conditions explicit in order to bring out points of similarity with the celebrated account of promises provided in recent 4 philosophy by John Searle. We find in both Hume and Searle a recognition that promising is a social institution which depends upon certain conventions, and that the conditions for promising reflect these conventions. Among the conditions which appear to be common to their different accounts are the following: 1.That a certain form of words is used (typically, of the form ' I promise...'). 2.That these words are understood by the speaker. 177 3.That they predicate an act of the speaker which will be performed for the interest or advantage of another. 4.That the action is not one which the speaker would undertake in the normal course of events. 5.That the speaker's utterance expresses a serious intention or resolution. 6.That in making this utterance the speaker wills the obligation to act accordingly. Let me comment briefly on these conditions. 1.The condition that a certain form of words is used in effect acknowledges that promising involves a distinctive type of speech act: namely, one which can, in itself, bind the speaker to the performance of an action (T 522). Presumably, however, this does not necessarily require the actual use of the words · I promise' — the context may determine that a promise has been made, even without the use of these words. We should note that language itself is, for Hume, the product of a convention (T 490); so also, therefore, must be the institution of promisemaking and promise-keeping. 2.The condition that these words are understood by the speaker is implicit in Hume's comment that while "the expression makes on most occasions the whole of the promise," someone who makes use of the expression without understanding its meaning "wou'd not certainly be bound by it" (T 523). It is a condition which relates to what Searle describes as the normal 'input' and 'output' conditions, i.e., the conditions which govern "serious and literal linguistic communication." It is presupposed, for example, that the speaker (and perhaps also the hearer) knows how to speak 178 the language, that he is not play-acting or speaking in jest, and so on. 3.The condition that these words predicate an act of the speaker for the interest or advantage of another is obviously implicit, at least, in Hume's account of promise-keeping as an artificial virtue (of which I will say more later). But it should be emphasised that a promise is not simply an undertaking to act in a certain way towards another person: it is a matter of undertaking to do something for that person. 4.That the action is not one which the speaker would normally undertake, again, is a condition for which Hume caters: indeed, it is an essential part of his account that an action which a person promises to perform is not one which would occur in accordance with his natural passions or inclinations (T 519). There may, nevertheless, be possible exceptions to this, as where someone promises to do something which self-interest would incline him to do anyway. But in this kind of case promising has for Hume the special function of increasing the... (shrink)

Tenth annual conference at the University of Manchester, 8th-10th April 1983.

Le statut de Pierre Bayle dans l'histoire des idées philosophiques et religieuses de l'époque classique a changé du tout au tout. D'observateur, il est devenu, dans l'historiographie actuelle, un acteur majeur dans les débats philosophiques, religieux et politiques de son époque, dont les écrits nourriront la réflexion des philosophes clandestins qui fondent les Lumières radicales. Ce volume d'études contribue à cette nouvelle interprétation du statut et de la portée du rationalisme de Bayle.

This paper reinvents Freire’s concepts of ‘banking education’ and ‘literacy’ within the context of the exponential growth of digital instruction in the 21st century. We argue that digital learning (i.e. online or technology enhanced) undoubtedly increases access to education globally, but also can intensify some of the worst problems described in Freire’s banking model. Accordingly, we draw from postdigital theory to scrutinize the specific structures and functions of common digital Learning Management Systems (LMSs) used by schools (i.e. Blackboard and Google (...) Classroom) to reveal a type of learning that further exacerbates the teacher-student dichotomy without liberating either party in a Freirean sense. We then use a Foucauldian lens to bring an awareness to how the accelerated use of these systems at scale, in part caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, can further entrench a data-driven, dehumanized educational experience which increases corporate profitability perhaps over the needs of students. Finally, we use these insights to modernize Freire’s concept of ‘literacy’ by building on Critical Medial Literacy (CML) in order to help educators address LMSs, (mis)information facilitated by digital content, and schooling in a (post)pandemic and postdigital world. (shrink)

La question du nihilisme a une longue histoire. Elle émerge au sein de l'idéalisme allemand, se déploie ensuite dans l'intelligentsia et la littérature russes, puis trouve chez Nietzsche et Heidegger ses explorations les plus influentes. Si le mot semble moins courant depuis un demi-siècle -- comme d'autres termes aussi chargés, pensons à celui d'aliénation -- les enjeux qu'il soulève demeurent toutefois au cœur de la pensée contemporaine. Les risques environnementaux nourrissent d'ailleurs plus que jamais l'inquiétante intuition que de puissantes dynamiques (...) de dévalorisation du réel sont à l'œuvre dans les sociétés modernes. Ces douze essais, qui font largement entendre la voix d'une nouvelle génération, n'ont pourtant pas pour but de défendre une thèse commune. Ils explorent plutôt les multiples aspects du nihilisme et se confrontent à ses grandes interprétations. Sont ainsi proposées autant de pistes pour rejoindre les débats sur le capitalisme, la technique, l'éducation, le patriarcat, le roman ou la démocratie. Pluralité revendiquée, qui illustre néanmoins un même ancrage dans les défis du monde actuel. (shrink)

The second word in the subtitle of this article is crucial. For there can be no doubt but that the possibility of sociobiology below the human level has already been abundantly realized in, for instance, the main body of E. O. Wilson's enormous and encyclopedic treatise Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. What may more reasonably be doubted, and what is in fact questioned here, is whether, as Wilson and others hope and believe, there is much room, or indeed any, for a (...) sociobiology of our own notoriously wayward and idiosyncratic species. In proposing this particular project Wilson and his colleagues have seen themselves as promoting a climactic conquest for evolutionary biology. For surely, they seem to have thought, now, more than a century after Darwin, it is high time and past time to launch the final assault upon the last citadel. But, as we shall proceed to argue, there are reasons—reasons which were available at least in outline even to Darwin himself—why the ideas which have been so triumphantly successful in explaining The Origin of Species cannot properly be applied to what is in truth a fundamentally different task. They cannot, that is to say, properly be transferred to explain developments either within or out of the particular problem species of which the author of that book, along with both all the authors and all the readers of all other books, have been themselves members. (shrink)

One of the most commonly referenced ethical principles when it comes to the management of dying patients is the doctrine of double effect (DDE). The DDE affirms that it is acceptable to cause side effects (e.g. respiratory depression) as a consequence of symptom‐focused treatment. Much discussion of the ethics of end of life care focuses on the question of whether actions (or omissions) would hasten (or cause) death, and whether that is permissible. However, there is a separate question about the (...) permissibility of hastening or causing unconsciousness in dying patients. Some authors have argued that the DDE would not permit end of life care that directly aims to render the patient unconscious. The claim is that consciousness is an objective human good and therefore doctors should not intentionally (and permanently) suppress it. Three types of end of life care (EOLC) practices will be explored in this article. The first is symptom‐based management (e.g. analgesia); the second is proportional terminal sedation as a means of relieving suffering (also referred to as palliative sedation or continuous deep sedation); and finally, deliberate and rapid sedation to unconsciousness until death (a practice we call terminal anaesthesia in this paper). After examining the common arguments for the various types of symptom‐based management and sedation, we apply the DDE to the latter two types of EOLC practices. We argue that aiming at unconsciousness, contrary to some claims, can be morally good or at least morally neutral in some dying patients. (shrink)

Expressions designating collectives, such as “the committee” or “the ships in the port”, may be interpreted de re or de dicto, depending on context, according as they pick out collectives defined by their members or collectives defined by some criterion for membership. We call these E-collectives and I-collectives respectively, and in this paper we explore in depth the relationship between these two categories. In particular, we identify important respects in which they differ, regarding the nature of the dependence of the (...) collective on its members, the nature of the parthood relation in which the members stand to the whole, and, from an application perspective, the different methods used for identifying the two forms of collective from large spatio-temporal data-sets. (shrink)

The premodern history of the European university can be divided into two triads of three centuries: the medieval university and the ‘medieval’ university of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During these last three centuries Europe’s Christian university was a ‘confessional’ university: the catholic, Lutheran, reformed and Anglican university and the dissenter university of New England. The reformed university of these centuries offered a distinctive way of systematic thought. A specific doctrine of God was connected with a distinct ontology and (...) this combination constituted the theoretical framework of its philosophy and theology. What are the main distinctive features of this scholastic way of thought and can a specific traditionhistorical background be identified ? I– The key concept of this systematic way of thought is God’s free knowledge . This free knowledgeis here understood to be God’s knowledge of future states of affairs – see section 7 for the main lines of Turrettini’s doctrine of God. This free knowledge of future states of affairs is also called definite , because future states of affairs are definite on the basis of God’s certain will. Thus God’s free knowledge is partly based on divine will, but the other pillar of God’s free knowledge is that divine knowledge which is structurally prior to an act of divine will: God’s ‘natural’ knowledge . This natural or necessary knowledge of God encompasses all possible states of affairs. This structure turning around the notion of scientia libera is vital for understanding Western thought, because Aristotelianism and latin Averroism, Thomism and nominalism do not dispose of this notion of scientia libera. Such a free knowledge doctrine of God is married to a specific type of ontology, namely a contingency ontology– see section 8. This type of ontology centres on the notion of fundamental possibility. All possible states of affairs enjoy the status of possibility . This status of possibility is constituted by logical possibility. Turrettini joins Duns Scotus in defining the logicum possibile: If a state of affairs is possible, then it is not inconsistent that it obtains. Therefore, the twin concept of fundamental possibility is logical IMpossibility: What is logically impossible, is inconsistent and self-contradictory, because it includes contradictory predicates. This approach leads to the central ontological notion of synchronic contingency. Turrettini’s key term is even almost the same as this modern invention to name this crucial device: simultas potentiae. When is an event contingent in this sense? An event e is synchronically contingent at time t, if e is the case at time t – therefore eis possible – while it is possible too that e is not the case at the same time t. Because of the simultaneity of the possibility of the opposite, reality is not necessary. It is open. Thus, the tool of implicative necessity is essential to Turrettini’s methodology. It does not only govern his doctrine of God, but also his theory of true freedom of the human will. II – In contrast to traditional descriptions of reformed scholasticism, Turrettini’s theology is a theology of will and radical contingency in general and a theology of freedom and grace in particular. I have already indicated that Turrettini followed Scotism in vital respects and Duns Scotus stood on the shoulders of Henry of Ghent and of Bonaventure . The ontological infrastructure was delivered by Duns Scotus’ way of thinking structured by synchronic contingency, but the basics of this type of doctrine of God’s knowledge are already conspicuous in the so-called Summa fratris Aleandri . Thomas Aquinas substantially borrowing from Aristotle consciously deviates from this tradition built on the legacy of Augustine and Anselm, the Victorines and Alexander of Hales by ignoring the new theory of divine knowledge put forward by John of La Rochelle. This new approach develops a new relationship between God’s notitia simplex and notitia visionis on the one hand and his potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata on the other hand. (shrink)

The concept of randomness has been unjustly neglected in recent philosophical literature, and when philosophers have thought about it, they have usually acquiesced in views about the concept that are fundamentally flawed. After indicating the ways in which these accounts are flawed, I propose that randomness is to be understood as a special case of the epistemic concept of the unpredictability of a process. This proposal arguably captures the intuitive desiderata for the concept of randomness; at least it should suggest (...) that the commonly accepted accounts cannot be the whole story and more philosophical attention needs to be paid. 1. Randomness in science1.1Random systems1.2Random behaviour1.3Random sampling1.4Caprice, arbitrariness and noise2. Concepts of randomness2.1Von Mises/church/martin-löf randomness2.2KCS-randomness3. Randomness is unpredictability: preliminaries3.1Process and product randomness3.2Randomness is indeterminism?4. Predictability4.1Epistemic constraints on prediction4.2Computational constraints on prediction4.3Pragmatic constraints on prediction4.4Prediction defined5. Unpredictability6. Randomness is unpredictability6.1Clarification of the definition of randomness6.2Randomness and probability6.3Subjectivity and context sensitivity of randomness7. Evaluating the analysis[R]andomness … is going to be a concept which is relative to our body of knowledge, which will somehow reflect what we know and what we don't know. Henry E. Kyburg, Jr ([1974], p. 217)Phenomena that we cannot predict must be judged random. Patrick Suppes ([1984], p. 32). (shrink)

The Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy" employs a wide construal of 'philosophy' that was common in former centuries. Its biographical entries include writers on mainstream philosophical topics whose individual contribution was small (for example, writers of textbooks or minor critics of major figures). But the encyclopedia also includes celebrated figures from other intellectual domains (e.g. poets, mathematicians, scientists and clergymen), who had something to say on topics that count as broadly philosophical. This interdisciplinary approach, coupled with sophisticated indexing and cross-referencing, (...) makes "CEBP" easily accessible to students and specialists across a huge range of subjects. It will become a highly important resource to support teaching and research in literature, history, classics, cultural studies, politics, economics, language, aesthetics, psychology and science, as well as in mainstream philosophy itself. (shrink)

The anonimous scholiumOn all forms of syllogism was copied in 1884 from the Paris Codex 2064 by E. Richter. In 1899 M. Wallies published it in the preface to Ammonius' commentary on the Prior Analytics of Aristotle. There appear in that scholium, apart from the complex figure of Galenos, other characteristic forms of inference.Among these forms I found five so-called non-demonstrable stoic syllogisms, three modifications of the law of transposition of which the third is not mentioned by the authors of (...) Princ pia Mathematica, and a modification of the form of inference known as Euclid's law. This form of inference was applied by Euclid in mathematics and by Saccherius in syllogistics; it is mentioned for the first time by Cardan in a treatise of 1570 and later by Clavius in his commentary of 1574 on the Elements of Euclid and in the commentary on Theodosius'Sphaerica of the year 1586.In 1658 Erhard Weigel made the first attempt at refuting the logical law of Euclid as formulated by Cardan and Clavius and in 1686 James Bernoulli tried to prove it. (shrink)

After stressing the shortcomings of Darwinian accounts of self-consciousness and knowledge - i.e. in terms of their survival value - Anthony O'Hear presents Peirce's metaphysical hypotheses on cosmic evolution as an alternative approach that avoids those shortcomings. Although O'Hear does not straightforwardly defend Peirce's views, his argument suggests that only some teleological account of self-consciousness and knowledge is reasonable. The argument, though correct, is not enough to establish the metaphysical point O'Hear defends. Before developing his metaphysical ideas, Peirce's rejection of (...) natural selection as an explanation for every phenomenon brought him to consider the more appropriate question of how natural selection could give rise to a different kind of evolution. This involved outlining an evolutionary account of the origin of self-consciousness and of the mechanisms of belief fixation. The point is not one about Peirce, of course, but about the relationship between, on the one hand, biological and, on the other, psychological and cultural phenomena. (shrink)

The gig economy has become a hot topic. The term itself derives from the world of entertainment, particularly live music, where performers striving for recognition hope to get a few ‘gigs’ – i.e. short-term and sporadic opportunities for paid employment, with the understanding that such engagements are limited and without any future obligation on either party – employer or employee. This seemingly gives both parties significant autonomy, albeit not in equal measure. Indeed, the terms ‘employer’ and ‘employee’, with respective connotations (...) of extended and enduring responsibility, and mutual obligation, are hotly disputed. Are they self-employed contractors or employees of the company? In what follows, I show how key aspects of Zygmunt Bauman’s work prepare us for an understanding and appreciation of the gig economy, and other more extensive ramifications; particularly those exemplified in the success of the Open Source model, and its potential – or not – to provide the basis for new institutional forms appropriate and acceptable for our current context. (shrink)

: Accidents will survive the outbreak of driverless cars, but their moral implications will suffer substantial changes. The decision made today by a human in a fraction of a second will eventually be replaced by an algorithm subject to moral scrutiny. This not only raises the question of how the algorithm should work, or whether alternatives solutions are indeed comparable, but also changes the essence of the problem: from ascertaining liability to defining desired outcomes. In this paper, I first contest (...) two possible approaches to resolving the driverless car dilemma – which I call statistical and nominal – to conclude that neither is morally sound. I then propose an alternative solution based on “time-relative equality”, or always sparing younger people. This follows from seeking an egalitarian solution, that is the least intrusive – a position I defend from a possible ageist critique. Keywords: Driverless Cars; Accident; Algorithm; Age-relative Equality Condotti verso un incidente morale Riassunto: Vi saranno incidenti anche dopo la diffusione delle auto a guida autonoma, ma le loro implicazioni morali subiranno mutamenti sostanziali. Le decisioni prese oggi in una frazione di secondo dagli esseri umani saranno alla fine sostituite da un algoritmo soggetto a controllo morale. Sorge non solo il problema di come dovrebbe funzionare questo algoritmo – o se vi siano soluzioni alternative comparabili –, ma cambia anche la sostanza del problema: dall’accertamento dell’imputabilità alla definizione dell’esito auspicato. In questo lavoro discuterò due possibili approcci per risolvere il dilemma – che chiamerò “statistico” e “nominale” –, per concluderne che non sono moralmente corretti. Proporrò quindi una soluzione alternativa, basata sulla “eguaglianza tempo-relativa”, il principio per cui bisogna sempre salvare il più giovane. Questo segue dal cercare una soluzione egalitarista, che sia la meno intrusiva – una posizione che difenderò da una possibile critica che la vede come discriminatoria verso gli anziani. Parole chiave: Automobili a guida automatica; Incidenti; Algoritmo; Eguaglianza relativa all’età. (shrink)

A partir de la definición de la globalización neoliberal como un localismo occidental globalizado, expresión de un nuevo tipo de imperialismo cultural, el objetivo principal de este artículo es el de llevar a cabo una exposición analítica de la propuesta de traducción intercultural e interpolítica d..

There are various authors who discussed the nature and manner of the existence of aesthetic values and the characterisation of aesthetic experience, among others, Thomas Acquinas, Roman Ingarden, Władyslaw Tatarkiewicz, Stanisław Ossowski, and Mieczysław Wallis. Taking into consideration their positions, the author claims that, potentially, each object as a coincidence of respective qualities is suitable for an aesthetic attitude. It may appear aesthetically somewhat, such that it alone may move (with its contents), i.e. it may draw attention, stir, delight, arouse (...) fancy, affect strongly. All this may be done ..disinterestedly\", therefore without any reference to the practical sphere (to the sphere of usefulness, profit), nor should this object be a source of pleasure (,,cause good composition\"). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Isaac Barrow on the Mathematization of Nature: Theological Voluntarism and the Rise of Geometrical OpticsAntoni MaletIntroductionIsaac Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy embodies a strong program of mathematization that departs both from the mechanical philosophy of Cartesian inspiration and from Boyle’s experimental philosophy. The roots of Newton’s mathematization of nature, this paper aims to demonstrate, are to be found in Isaac Barrow’s (1630–77) philosophy of the mathematical sciences.Barrow’s attitude (...) towards natural philosophy evolved from his earnest interest in medicine of around 1650, when a young Cambridge graduate, to natural philosophy (apparently under Henry More’s influence); from his thesis on the insufficiency of the Cartesian hypothesis to geometrical optics and the strong program of mathematization of natural philosophy of the middle 1660s; from Lucasian professor of Mathematics to Chaplain of his Majesty and eminent Restoration divine. Contemporary accounts of Barrow’s life suggest that he grew ever more skeptical about the worth of natural philosophy and mathematics. 1 In his last years he became a prolific [End Page 265] author of sermons and theological works. Published shortly after his death by John Tillotson (1630–94), later archbishop of Canterbury, they occupy over two thousand folio pages. Overloaded with involved philosophical arguments, Barrow’s sermons were apparently not very popular, but they were highly regarded by scholars and the Anglican hierarchy. 2 It is on certain of his sermons, as well as on the philosophical discussions contained in the Mathematical Lectures that our account of Barrow’s philosophy of the mathematical sciences will rest. 3 Barrow’s understanding of the mathematical sciences will allow us to discuss together three issues often analyzed independently: the theological background to English natural philosophy, the changing notion of mixed mathematical sciences during the seventeenth century, and finally the philosophical foundations of modern geometrical optics.It has long been recognized that significant relationships exist between theological voluntarism or intellectualism and views on natural philosophy. In particular Robert Boyle’s theological voluntarism is seen as grounding his experimentalist approach to natural philosophy. It is not quite so clear, however, how well theological voluntarism may relate to a strong program of mathematization such as the one embodied in Newton’s Principia Mathematica. In fact it has been suggested that the relationship is a negative one. This is derived from the necessary character of mathematical laws, which would put unwanted restrictions on God’s absolute dominion over nature, and also from the notion that theological intellectualism is conducive to a deductive, a priori science—the paradigm of which is of course geometry. However, Barrow’s theological voluntarism lead him to heighten the role of mathematics within natural philosophy.During the seventeenth century the so-called mixed or subalternate mathematical sciences changed profoundly. In the Enlightenment mixed mathematics—meaning above all rational mechanics—became one of the most prestigious and influential disciplines. The mixed mathematics of the Enlightenment, however, was markedly different from the Aristotelian [End Page 266] mixed mathematical sciences. The differences are noticeable both in the subject matter and in the substitution of mathematical infinitesimal analysis for geometrical synthesis, but also in the way of grounding mathematical theory on empirical evidence. Barrow’s Mathematical Lectures (delivered at Cambridge from 1664 to 1666) offer a fresh insight into the metamorphosis of these sciences just when Newton’s “mathematical principles” were in the making. Not the least interesting feature of Barrow’s discussion is that God’s omnipotence allows an evaluation of the truth of mathematical theories that do not apply to this world. Therefore, Barrow is led to introduce the distinction between the internal consistency, or mathematical truth, of a mathematical theory and its physical truth. This, in turn, leads him to the notion that theories need testing.Barrow on Matter and GodRecent literature has established significant correlations between theological voluntarism and empiricism, as well as between theological intellectualism and rationalism. As E. B. Davis writes, “the Christian doctrine of creation is a dialogue between God’s unconstrained will, which utterly transcends the bounds of human comprehension, and God’s orderly intellect, which serves as the model for the human mind.” Intellectualist theology considers God’s omniscience His... (shrink)

relevant alternatives: I take it that a process is reliable in the actual world iff, in the actual set of outcomes (i.e. beliefs being formed), the frequency of successes (those beliefs being true) is much greater than the frequency of failures (those beliefs being false). One may wish to run a more sophisticated kind of reliabilism, where one demands that a reliable process also be reliable in counterfactual situations, but one need not, and I won’t here. If perception is a (...) reliable belief forming process, then I can know things on the basis of perception. So let’s say I know p on the basis of perception. To know that I know p involves, first, knowing that I believe p, and second, knowing that I believe p on the basis of a reliable belief forming process, by the definition of knowledge. But can I know either of these things? (shrink)

Tomando como marco de referencia algunos conceptos básicos de la teoría política de Gramsci, el objetivo principal de este artículo es criticar la función hegemónica e ideológica que la democracia representativa desempeña en el contexto social e histórico de la globalización neoliberal. Lejos de avanzar hacia el ideal emancipador que representa, en la época del neoliberalismo globalizado la democracia es un instrumento de dominación al servicio de una regulación social excluyente y desigual que origina nuevas formas de autoritarismo.